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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Oil palm (Elaeis guineensis) is of strategic importance 
to the Ghanaian economy. It is the second most 
important industrial crop after cocoa and is used 
widely in local food preparation as well as in industrial 
processing. In spite of its importance, however, oil 
palm has consistently underperformed since the 
early twentieth century. This paper conducts a value 
chain analysis of the crop, foregrounding the political 
economy factors that shape the performance of 
the sector. It draws on a combination of in-depth 
interviews conducted in March 2020 with a variety 
of value chain actors and a review of the secondary 
literature. Additionally, between late May and early 
June 2020, twelve further interviews were conducted 
as part of a rapid market survey to assess the impact 
of the COVID-19 pandemic on the value chain. 
The oil palm industry in Ghana serves two distinct 
markets, namely domestic consumption and industrial 
processing. The value chain, therefore, has two largely 
independent segments corresponding to the end-
market served. The industrial processing segment 
comprises large- and medium-scale plantations and 
processing mills. The estate plantations possess their 
own mills and process palm oil on their establishments. 
They have higher productivity because they enjoy the 
advantage of improved input, economies of scale, and 
superior technology. On the other hand, productivity in 
the home consumption segment, which is dominated 
by smallholders, is impeded by factors like low-yielding 
oil palm varieties, fragmented landholdings, and low-
quality crude palm oil (CPO). 
Even though the oil palm sector has enjoyed policy 
attention since at least the early twentieth century, and 
significantly more so since independence, growth in 
the industry continues to be weak. Since the return to 
constitutional rule in the 1990s, the logic of electoral 
competition within the context of limited economic 
development has increased the preference of political 
leaders for policies with immediate electoral payoffs. 
Additionally, policymakers are reluctant to make tough 
but necessary decisions regarding the sector or to 
stick to such decisions once they are made. Within 
this political economy context, policies designed to 
promote growth in the oil palm industry have failed to 
address longstanding structural barriers to productivity. 
However, actors in both segments of the value chain 
express optimism that the Tree Crop Development 
Authority, launched in September 2020 (GOG 2020), 
will turn the fortunes of the industry.
The outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic has affected 
every segment of the value chain. Falling world market 
prices for palm oil caused a reduction in farmgate 
prices for fruits. At the same time, domestic demand 
for palm oil dropped as eateries closed or reduced 
operations and border closures shut off access to sub-
regional markets, prompting many agri-businesses 
along the chain to lay off workers and to substantially 
scale down production.
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As Ghana’s second most important cash crop, oil palm 
(Elaeis guineensis) has strategic importance to the 
national economy. However, despite its significance, 
the oil palm sector has consistently underperformed 
and responded weakly to government incentives. 
In the nineteenth century, it was one of the most 
important export commodities from the Gold Coast, 
but since the turn of the twentieth century, production 
has been unable to meet the domestic demand. 
Successive governments have devoted a great deal 
of policy attention and resources to developing the oil 
palm sector as part of a broader agenda to stimulate 
industrial growth and to reduce rural poverty. This 
paper conducts a value chain analysis of the crop, 
highlighting the political economy factors that shape 
the performance of the sector, and the distribution of 
rewards among participants along the chain.
Value chain analyses are analytical, and political and 
pragmatic in nature. As an exercise, value chain analyses 
detail the steps involved in moving a commodity from 
the initial stages (e.g. nursing seedlings) to eventual 
delivery to consumers. The value chain also details 
the roles that various actors play at each stage of 
production. The political and pragmatic aspect has 
to do with identifying binding constraints that inhibit 
productivity, such as lack of access to improved 
seedlings or use of inefficient technology in cultivation. 
Stakeholders then come up with solutions to make the 
chain more efficient (Donovan et al. 2015; Prowse and 
Moyer-Lee 2014). In recent times, value chain analyses 
explicitly focus on issues of ‘inclusivity’ along the 
chain (Manley and Leynseele 2019; Shepherd 2016). 
Inclusive value chain analyses aim to promote a just 
social outcome by contributing to poverty reduction or 
women’s empowerment (Donovan et al. 2015). 
The political settlement perspective provides a useful 
framework for understanding the broad structural and 
relational factors that shape how particular value chains 
work. The political settlement approach is premised on 
the idea that enforcement of formal rules or policies is 
shaped by the social context within which such rules are 
implemented. This includes informal practices and the 
groups whose interests could be affected by any given 
policy intervention. The political settlement approach 
further emphasises that the social distribution of power 
rarely overlaps with formal institutional arrangements. 
Hence, studies that focus exclusively on the workings 
of formal institutions, or that construe informality as 
something unusual, fail to understand how policies 
are made and implemented in reality (Khan 2018). It is 
the incentive structures underpinning the interactions 
between formality and informality which drives the 
politics of development, as multiple case studies have 
confirmed (Behuria 2020; Appiah and Abdulai 2017; 
Asante 2012; Fold and Whitfield 2012).
In fact, the economist Mushtaq Khan, who developed 
the approach, is emphatic that a country’s political 
settlement shapes the way its formal institutions 
work. Formal institutions impose different costs and 
generate different benefits for different groups. A 
policy to encourage production for export may divert 
state resources from supporting farmers who produce 
mainly for the domestic market. Accordingly, factions 
develop in response to these policies and the struggle 
over the distribution of rents resulting from any given 
institution or policy intervention. In democratic systems 
such as Ghana's, factions may be organised within 
political parties or as independent pressure groups 
or trade associations. When formulating policies or 
distributing resources, political leaders attempt to 
minimise the risks posed by factions that have the 
ability to cause ‘real political trouble’ (Burton and 
Higley 2001 cited in Hickey 2013). Ruling coalitions, 
therefore, consider this threat and, depending on the 
level of regime vulnerability, may respond in a variety 
of ways. This includes heavy-handed responses, 
conciliatory moves – via co-optation, rent distribution 
etc. – or ignoring the threat altogether.
If a policy proposal is likely to involve heavy losses 
for a social group or faction which is strong enough 
to mobilise credible opposition to the government, 
policymakers are likely to back down, or to make 
concessions to the affected groups. On the other 
hand, where productive forces, such as farmers, 
business groups, or manufacturers, are weak or 
unable to effectively mobilise substantial opposition, it 
is unlikely that policymakers will seriously consider their 
concerns when formulating policies. In these struggles, 
social groups who have “holding power”, i.e. those 
who can absorb short-term losses while maintaining 
1 INTRODUCTION THE POLITICAL ECONOMY, 
VALUE CHAINS, AND INCLUSION
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their position in the relative distribution of power, are 
more likely to win in the long-term (Khan 2018). These 
dynamics are apparent, some more so than others, in 
the organisation of Ghana’s oil palm value chain and in 
the policies formulated to develop the chain.
This paper attempts to explain why the oil palm 
sector has consistently underperformed, in spite 
of successive governments prioritising the industry 
since colonialism ended. It does this through an 
analysis of the secondary literature, including 
reports, journal articles, and policy documents. This 
is supplemented with twelve interviews conducted 
in March 2020 with actors along the value chain, 
including producer associations, officials of the 
Ministry of Food and Agriculture, representatives of 
donor agencies, and officials of non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) or civil society organisations 
(CSOs). Between late May and early June 2020, 
twelve additional interviews were conducted as part 
of a rapid market survey to assess the impact of the 
COVID-19 pandemic on the value chain. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next 
section presents a historical account of the rise and 
continued decline of the oil palm value chain. The third 
section provides an overview of the industry, briefly 
describing its performance and contribution to the 
national economy. The fourth section maps the value 
chain, highlighting the challenges at each step of the 
chain and the lines of social difference and inequality 
within it. The fifth section discusses the wider political 
economy context within which policies targeting the 
industry have been framed since independence. The 
following section reflects on the impact of the COVID-19 
outbreak on the value chain. In the conclusion, the 
paper returns to the question why an economic sector 
would consistently underperform even though it has 
had policy attention for decades.
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Palm oil production has been deeply enmeshed 
with economic and political developments in Ghana 
for centuries, but became politically important from 
the early decades of the nineteenth century. When 
the slave trade was abolished in 1807, the ensuing 
economic vacuum was filled by the so-called ‘legitimate 
trade’, consisting of the export of primary commodities 
like palm oil, groundnut, and ivory, and the import of 
manufactured goods from Europe. The advent of 
legitimate trade had such a important impact on social 
and political structures of nineteenth century West 
Africa, not least, the Gold Coast, that Hopkins (cited 
in Law 1995: 4) concluded that it was ‘the start of the 
modern economic history of West Africa.’ Legitimate 
commerce shifted the prevailing power dynamics 
by raising an influential class of men connected with 
the trade between West Africa and Europe (Asante 
2018; Dumett 1983). Known as ‘merchant princes’, 
these traders became politically important allies 
to the emerging colonial state. However, they later 
transformed into an early protest movement, when they 
were gradually pushed to the margins of the colonial 
government, which by the end of the eighteenth 
century had grown more self-assured (Asante 2019).
Palm oil production and export became a major 
economic activity in the nineteenth century Gold Coast 
from the 1820s. Palm oil and palm kernels were the 
most important commodity exports and the largest 
source of export revenue for the colonial government 
during this period, in 1884 accounting for as much as 
70 per cent of total exports from the colony (Howard 
1978, cited in Gyasi 1992) until oil palm was eclipsed by 
the cocoa economy in the first decade of the twentieth 
century (Wilson 1990). 
And yet, in spite of oil palm's centrality to the nineteenth 
century colonial economy, it was characterised by 
peasant production, with official policy having little 
influence on the value chain. At the start of legitimate 
commerce, oil palm was harvested in the wild but was 
subsequently cultivated by peasants in the hinterlands. 
Coastal-based merchants bought the processed palm 
oil in the inland areas, from where it was rolled in barrels 
to the coast for export.
Access to large tracts of land for plantation production 
was a politically sensitive matter. An attempt by the 
colonial government in 1896 and 1897 to vest ‘unused’ 
land in the hands of the colonial government sparked 
spontaneous protest and led to the formation of the 
first national protest movement in the colony (Kimble 
1963). Stung by that experience, both metropolitan 
and local officials were reluctant to intervene further 
in land matters. This event turned out to be fateful by 
discouraging the colonial government from subsequent 
land tenure reforms, and ensured that small-scale or 
peasant farmers dominated the production of the main 
commercial crops (like oil palm, rubber, coffee, and 
subsequently cocoa). Furthermore, and in spite of the 
incentives created by later governments, plantations or 
formal estates accounted for only a small fraction of 
output (Fold and Whitfield 2012). 
Thus, the emergence of oil palm as a backbone of the 
economy was independent of direct colonial policy 
intervention. Nevertheless, the oil palm industry had 
grown partly as a result of the presence of the colonial 
administration. Gyasi (1992) observes that even though 
the littoral belt lacked the ideal ecological features 
necessary for oil palm production, ‘political instability 
and poor transportation in the interior’ ensured that the 
belt did not extend too far from the coastal areas (see 
Hypothesis One in the Appendix). Its entire stretch of 
about 500km from Dzodze in the east to Half Asini in 
the west ran parallel to the coastline where the colonial 
administration, as basic as it was, had some presence 
(Gyasi 1992: 42). 
After a high point in 1884, the oil palm economy 
entered a phase of rapid decline due to a combination 
of factors, including plummeting world market prices 
for the commodity, felling of trees to produce palm 
wine, and growing political instability in the coastal 
and inland areas owing to greater intervention by the 
colonial government in the social and political affairs 
of the traditional states. This was further compounded 
by the fact that the principal African merchants were 
at this point increasingly being marginalised in the 
international trade as racial discrimination against 
the educated African elite intensified towards the end 
of the nineteenth century (Asante 2019; Gyasi 1992; 
Dummet 1983).
Belated attempts by the colonial government did 
little to stop the decline of the oil palm sector. This 
2 HISTORICAL CONTEXT
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included efforts to incentivise estate production with 
the Oil Palm Ordinance of 1912, which allowed the 
government to award processing rights to all fruits 
produced within 16km of a mill, and an arrangement 
under the 1929 General Scheme for Subsiding Palm 
Oil Factories, which subsidised large mills if fruits fell 
below five-sixths of processing capacity. In addition, 
starting from 1949, the government established oil 
palm service centres in interior regions such as Volta, 
Eastern, Central, Western, Ashanti, and Brong Ahafo, 
where ecological conditions were more favourable 
to oil palm production. The new oil palm belt that 
eventually emerged was concentrated along these 
service centres (Gyasi 1992). However, this was too 
little, too late, and palm oil exports continued to 
steadily decline until in 1955, when export ceased 
altogether (Gyasi 1992: 43).
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3 OVERVIEW OF THE CHAIN
Oil palm is one of ten industrial crops produced in 
Ghana. The oil palm industry is of strategic importance 
to the national economy. As the second most important 
industrial crop after cocoa, it makes a key contribution 
to agricultural development. The agricultural sector 
is integral to many African economies, including 
Ghana. Although agriculture’s economic dominance 
has declined in recent years due to the expansion 
of the service sector, it still contributes significantly 
to economic growth in the country. For instance, 
agriculture employs over a third of the economically 
active population (GSS 2019; ISSER 2019). Moreover, 
between 2013 and 2018, the agricultural sector’s 
average contribution to gross domestic product (GDP) 
was 21.6 per cent, with industry and services being 
34.5 per cent and 43.9 per cent respectively (ISSER 
2019). Agriculture also contributes significantly to the 
country’s foreign exchange earnings, even though the 
cocoa sub-sector outperforms all other crops in this 
regard (ISSER 2019).
There is a lack of accurate data on the current state 
of the oil palm industry, a situation which partly 
reflects wider problems facing the industry. Producing 
companies are reluctant to share information that 
their competitors may take advantage of, or which 
could increase their tax liability (executive of OPDAG 
pers. comm. May 2020; and Statistics, Research and 
Information Directorate (SRID) of MoFA official pers. 
comm. May 2020). Available information on the current 
Table 3.1: Annual area planted to selected crops, (‘000s ha) 
Crop 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Cocoa 1,600.30 1,600.80 1,650.80 1,683.77 1,717.44 1,751.79 1,786.83 1,826.82
Oil palm 381.80 397.10 409.10 349.04 425.60 434.12 346.71 351.39
Cashew 82.00 86.50 89.00 90.78 92.60 94.45 95.00 118.75
Coconut 25.30 25.30 26.10 26.60 27.15 27.70 28.25 28.68
Rubber 25.80 26.00 26.80 27.35 27.88 28.44 29.01 29.59
Note: Figures are based on projections from Statistics, Research and Information Directorate
Source: MoFA (2019a)
Table 3.2 Production of industrial crops (metric tonnes)
Year Cocoa Coffee Rubber Oil palm 
2007/08 680,781 2,024 14,132 1,896,760
2008/09 710,642 516 19,134 2,103,600
2009/10 632,037 4,082 n.a. 2,004,300
2010/11 1,024,554 9,035 n.a. 2,125,645
2011/12 879,348 48,517 n.a. 2,196,098
2012/13 835,466 43,931 n.a. 2,334,400
2013/2014 896,220 45,093 n.a. 2,451,130
2014/2015 740,254 42,230 n.a. 2,529,513
2015/2016 778,043 n.a. n.a. n.a.
2016/2017 969,500 n.a. n.a. n.a.
2017/2018 904,790 n.a. n.a. n.a.
2018/19 919,577 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Source: MoFA (2019a)
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state of the industry is based on baseline estimates from 
the Planting for Export and Rural Development (PERD) 
programme, which puts the land area under cultivation 
for 2018 at 420,000ha (MoFA SRID official pers. comm. 
May 2020). The area of land planted to oil palm has 
fluctuated over recent years, reaching a highpoint of 
434,120ha in 2016, before lowering to 346,710ha in 
2017, as shown in Table 3.1 below (MoFA 2019a).
Available data shows a slight year-on-year increase 
in the production of oil palm since the mid–2000s. 
Apart from an almost 100,000mt drop in production 
in 2009/10 production year, the oil palm sector 
has witnessed a steady increase in output, from 
1,896,760mt in 2007/08 to 2,529,513mt in 2014/15. 
These figures, the last year when data was available, 
are an increase of about 700,000mt. In comparison, 
cocoa output expanded from 680,781mt to 919,577mt 
during the same period (see Table 3.2).
Production of CPO has also consistently increased 
since the early 2000s. This expansion in production 
has been partially attributed to the effects of the 
privatisation of state-owned farms or estates following 
structural adjustment (Huddleston and Tonts 2007). 
In the period between 2006 and 2015, production 
grew by more than 204,000t. However, independent 
smallholders accounted for a huge bulk of the output. 
In fact, over the period, CPO production by estate mills 
has declined by 2,956t while smallholder production 
has almost doubled (see Table 3.3).
There is currently no accurate count of the total number 
of persons employed directly by the oil palm economy 
(SRID MoFA official pers. comm. May 2020; executives 
of Artisanal Palm Oil and OPDAG pers. comm. May 
2020), but the Ghana Living Standards Survey gives 
the number of households who harvested oil palm as 
119,724 (GSS 2019). It has also been estimated that, 
across the entire value chain, the industry generates 
over two million jobs in rural Ghana, and that expanding 
production to fill the domestic deficit alone could 
create additional 141,000 direct jobs (MASDAR 2011: 
1.32–2.32).
If productive capacity is enhanced, oil palm producing 
countries in Africa stand to reap substantial gains due 
to growing demand for palm oil within the continent, 
and on the world market. Growing demand has been 
fuelled by a number of factors, including: population 
growth; rising prosperity and nutrition; and increasing 
demand for palm-based halal food products by 
Muslim populations. Furthermore, the shift from 
petroleum-based products and the search for 
alternative sources of fuels has further boosted global 
attention in the commodity. Recent applications include 
uses as feedstock in biofuel production and as an 
ingredient in the manufacture of detergents, surfactants, 
pharmaceuticals, and nutraceuticals (MASDAR 2011).
There is a large demand for CPO for home consumption 
in Ghana. Over half of all Ghanaian households use palm 
oil as an ingredient in food preparation, although this is 
less prevalent in the northern parts of the country, where 
shea butter is used as a substitute (MASDAR 2011). The 
rate of growth in consumption, about 2.4 per cent per 
annum, has been closely linked to population growth, 
and demand was estimated at 379,000mt in 2011 
(MASDAR 2011). Because of the high demand for palm 
oil for domestic consumption, the industrial-use sector 
competes with the artisanal processing sector for FFBs. 
Industrial processors are, thus, dependent on imports 
Table 3.3 Crude palm oil production estimates (tonnes)
Companies 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
GOPDC 28,743.10 17,842.70 18,055.68 20,143.00 18,960.54 18,045.80 17,131.05 16,216.30 17,027.12 17,476.16
BOPP 16,485.00 15,305.00 14,960.18 14,124.00 14,232.57 13,916.82 13,601.07 17,554.00 17,817.31 18,173.66
TOPP 20,348.00 14,797.10 14,249.66 17,373.00 14,544.40 13,627.94 12,711.48 11,795.02 11,971.95 12,930.16
NGL (NOPL) 7,019.00 7,721.00 8,492.83 12,775.00 11,812.93 12,856.74 13,900.55 14,944.36 15,168.53 15,579.07
AMEEN 9,805.00 10,785.50 11,863.68 11,000.00 12,589.86 13,314.50 14,039.14 14,763.78 14,985.24 15,284.94
Sub-total 82,400.10 66,451.30 67,622.03 75,415.00 72,140.30 71,761.80 71,383.29 75,273.46 76,970.13 79,443.99
Medium-
scale mills





250,888.00 275,976.80 303,572.32 316,222.00 342,012.51 364,279.77 386,547.04 408,814.30 429,255.02 450,913.43
Source: MoFA (2017a)
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to meet the shortfall, with the large-scale plantations 
they depend on not able to produce enough to meet 
demand (Fold and Whitfield 2012). 
In spite of the strategic importance of the oil palm industry, 
it has consistently underperformed for almost a century, 
and efforts by successive governments to promote it have 
only yielded weak results (see section six). This reflects the 
lacklustre performance of oil palm production in Africa. 
Between 1980 and 2011, Africa’s share of the global 
commercial production of palm oil contracted from 27 per 
cent to 3 per cent, and the continent is unable to produce 
enough to meet internal demand (MASDAR 2011: 1.10). In 
2008, production was only able to meet 55 per cent of 
the domestic demand. In 2010, West Africa produced less 
than 4 per cent of the global output. This poor performance 
is partially due to the dominance of smallholders, who 
rely on rudimentary processing technology (i.e. the semi-
mechanised Kramer machine) and lack access to improved 
planting materials or finance. Smallholders plant the dura 
variety while the high-yielding improved tenera variety is 
planted by the estate plantations (Osei-Amponsah 2013). 
Within this regional picture, Ghana’s performance is even 
poorer, accounting for 6 per cent of African CPO supply. 
By contrast, Nigeria produces 46 per cent and Cote 
d’Ivoire 16 per cent of the African output (MASDAR 2011).
Policy initiatives since the early 2000s have been focused 
on the opportunities arising from the regional and global 
demand for the commodity, although the immediate 
aim has been to reduce the import bill on palm oil (see 
Hypothesis Three in the Appendix). Although policies 
have yielded some modest results, growth in the sector 
has been sluggish and has lagged behind expansion in 
the global industry. A master plan study commissioned 
by MoFA in 2010 estimates that, if current production 
trends persist, CPO supply will only grow at a rate of 3 
per cent per annum, meaning that in the 15-year period 
between 2010 and 2025, estimated production will only 
increase from 244,335mt to 382,000mt. This growth 
in production will not be enough to absorb domestic 
demand, a situation which could shoot up the deficit 
from 32,000mt to 127,000mt. The supply deficit for West 
Africa, which is also expected to grow at the same rate, is 
estimated at around 450,000mt by 2024 (MASDAR 2011).
This shows that oil palm has a potential to greatly 
contribute to the country’s GDP. Additionally, the past 
few decades have witnessed an expanding demand for 
vegetable oils, with palm oil accounting for well over half 
of the global trade in edible oils. As Figure 3.1 shows, 
palm oil production grew from 1980–2010, more than 
doubling every decade. Between 1980 and 2008, global 
palm oil production grew from 4.5 million tonnes to 45.1 
million tonnes. From an 11 per cent share in vegetable 
oil production in 1980, palm accounted for 34 per cent 
in 2010 (MASDAR: 1.20), outstripping the contribution of 
any other source of edible oil.
Figure 3.1 World production of vegetable oils, 1980–2008
Years
1980

























1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Source: MASDAR (2011)
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The structure of Ghana’s oil palm industry has been 
shaped by it serving two distinct markets –domestic 
consumption and industrial processing – leading to 
two largely independent sub-sections within the value 
chain. The industrial processing sub-sector comprises 
of large- and medium-scale plantations, and processing 
mills. The estate plantations process CPO on site. This 
sub-sector is more productive because production 
takes place on a large scale, aided by superior and 
efficient technology. On the other hand, the home 
consumption sub-sector, dominated by independent 
smallholders, faces impediments like low-yielding 
varieties, fragmented landholdings, and rudimentary 
technology, factors that negatively affect its productivity 
and quality of output (Osei-Amponsah et al. 2014; Fold 
and Whitfield 2012: 14). Although analytically distinct, 
the two sub-sectors are not entirely separate. In reality, 
the industry is built on a rich diversity of co-existing 
production systems:
ranging from the collection of palm nuts as a non-
timber forest product (NTFP), to the domestication 
of oil palm through agroforestry and mixed crop 
production for local processing and local trade, 
to the establishment of industrial plantations and 
the export of palm oil as an internationally traded 
commodity (Khatun et al. 2020: 4).
The separate stages in the value chain include input 
supply, cultivation or production, processing, and 
marketing. Figure 4.1 shows the five core stages, as 
well as the outside actors who support, interact with, 
or are otherwise interested in the performance of the 
value chain.
4.1. Stages along the chain
4.1.1. Input-provision
The first stage concerns input provision. The necessary 
inputs include planting materials (sprouted seeds and 
seedlings), fertiliser, herbicides and insecticides, and 
4 MAPPING THE CHAIN
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protective equipment like boots and masks. The Oil 
Palm Research Institute (OPRI) carries out research 
into oil palm development and supplies planting 
materials to growers. OPRI was originally established 
as a division of the Crop Research Institute of the 
Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR), 
but became an autonomous institute of CSIR in 1988. 
Since 1992, OPRI has taken on added responsibility for 
research into coconut, especially the Cape St. Paul’s 
Wilt Disease (OPRI researchers, pers. comm. March 
2020). The government, through MoFA, also provides 
technical and extension services to smallholder 
farmers (Ofosu-Budu and Sarpong 2013).
Other inputs, like fertiliser, can be purchased on the 
open market. In Ghana, fertiliser use is more prevalent 
on export or cash crops than on food crops (FAO 
2005), even though fertiliser application across all 
crop sectors tend to be low, even in comparison to 
the African average (Banful 2009). The government 
introduced a fertiliser subsidy programme (FSP) in 
2008 to encourage fertiliser use, but the programme 
has suffered many implementation challenges. These 
include inefficient distribution protocols, smuggling 
to neighbouring countries, and politically motivated 
targeting, whereby more fertiliser coupons were 
allocated to districts where the ruling government 
had performed poorly in the previous elections, in a 
bid to win more votes from these areas in subsequent 
elections (Banful 2011). Still, the FSP is only designed for 
food crop farmers, although an Oil Palm Development 
Association of Ghana (OPDAG) executive, who was 
interviewed for this study, believed the support should 
have been extended to oil palm producers.
4.1.2. Cultivation
There are three broad types of actors involved in 
production: 1) independent smallholders cultivating 
less than 10ha, 2) medium-scale plantations, and 
3) large industrial plantations or estates. It should 
be noted that many of these actors can be found in 
both the artisanal and industrial segments of the 
value chain. Independent smallholders dominate 
production, accounting for about 80 per cent of all 
fresh fruit bunches (FFBs) produced (Ofosu-Budu 
and Sarpong 2013). Production takes place across 
six regions (Brong Ahafo, Ashanti, Eastern, Volta, 
Central, and Western), with Eastern accounting for the 
largest area under cultivation (336,000ha) (MASDAR 
2011). Areas cultivated by estates has remained 
relatively unchanged, while those under independent 
smallholder cultivation has expanded substantially 
since the 1990s (see Figure 4.2).
Independent smallholders sell their fruit to either the 
industrial plantations or to medium-scale processors. 
A few engage in artisanal or small-scale processing for 
sale on local markets. Other smallholders are linked to 
the estates through nucleus and outgrower schemes. 
The nucleus schemes contractually bind the smallholder 
farmer to the estate on whose land they farm. Under 
these contracts, farmers receive planting materials, 
fertiliser, and other inputs from the estates as well as 
technical services on good agronomical practices. 
Cultivation may also be supervised by the estate. In 
turn, the smallholder farmer is obligated to sell to the 
estate (Ofosu-Budu and Ruml and Qaim 2020; Sarpong 
2013). Outgrowers, on the other hand, cultivate adjacent 
land to the estate plantations. Like nucleus farmers, they 
also receive planting materials and other inputs from the 
estate on credit, which they repay in kind upon harvest 
on terms more favourable than what may be obtained 
from commercial banks. They remain under the contract 
until the loan has been fully repaid, after which they may 
continue to sell to the estates at an agreed price (Ofosu-
Budu and Sarpong 2013).
Figure 4.2 Area under estates and independent smallholdings
Source: Author’s construct based on MASDAR (2011)
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Nucleus smallholders and outgrowers have access to 
superior inputs and technical services by due to their 
estate ties, but the dependence on the estates and the 
truncation of control over many aspects of production 
leads to resentment and a breakdown of trust (Ruml 
and Qaim 2020; Ofosu-Budu and Sarpong 2013). For 
instance, violations of the contract by the outgrower 
could legally empower the estate to take over the 
farm until the loan has been fully repaid (Ofosu-Budu 
and Sarpong 2013). Independent smallholders, on 
the hand, enjoy full production autonomy, although 
they rely largely on inferior planting materials, and are 
dependent on government extension officers, who 
tend to lack resources and are spread thinly across 
large areas. As a result, the productivity of estate farms 
is three times higher than that of smallholder farms 
(MASDAR 2011).
The large estates aim to reduce their reliance on 
smallholders by expanding their plantations. However, 
they are constrained by problems relating to access 
to land, which often end up with extensive litigation. 
Already, there are tensions between many estates and 
local communities over the lands on which the estates 
have been established, because of longstanding 
grievances arising from issues of compensation for 
the appropriated lands on which the estates were 
established (MASDAR 2011).
4.1.3 Processing 
Palm oil processing serves both domestic consumption 
and industrial purposes. Actors involved in processing 
include large- and medium-scale mills, and small-
scale processors. The home-consumption market is 
supplied by the small-scale or artisanal processors, 
who are mostly women (Ofosu-Budu and Sarpong 
2013). Women who supplement farming with artisanal 
processing tend to be slightly better off than women 
who do not engage in similar off-farm economic 
activities (Dzanku et al. 2020). They buy FFBs from the 
open market, but some own their own oil palm farms. 
Artisanal processing is inefficient because it relies on 
rudimentary technology, a semi-mechanised processor 
– called Kramer – and the oil extraction rate is low.
The various stages of artisanal processing are labour-
intensive. For a typical working day, artisanal milling 
requires the labour of an average of 22 people, 
only a quarter of whom are men. Their jobs include 
transferring the fruits from trucks to shed, de-fruiting, 
removal of fruits, loading into boiler and boiling, moving 
the boiled fruit to the Kramer machine, pounding and 
squeezing, carrying to the frying pan, and frying the oil 
(Ofosu-Budu and Sarpong 2013: 364). The processed 
oil is supplied to market women, for onward transport 
to markets across Ghana, and to Togo and Nigeria.
The quality of CPO produced by the artisanal millers 
reflects their overall technological limitations. Moreover, 
processing practices, such as long storage of fruits 
before boiling, using tyres as fuel during boiling, and 
skipping the process of clarification of the oil in order to 
cut costs, negatively affects the quality of CPO (Osei-
Amponsah et al. 2012). Furthermore, CPO produced 
by artisanal millers is high in free fatty acids (FFA), 
making it uncompetitive in the high-paying markets 
(Osei-Amponsah et al. 2014). Estimates of net revenue 
of artisanal processing by Ofosu-Budu and Sarpong 
(2013: 370–1) show that processors derive more 
benefit by scaling-up production. They find that on 
average, in communities processing 30t of FFB per 
week in 2011, processors made a margin of GH¢23, 
while those processing 10t a week made a GH¢20 
profit. Those producing only 1t a week ran at a loss. 
Women, who tend to lack access to off-farm income 
that is so crucial to acquiring improved technology for 
artisanal processing, reap only a moderate profit from 
milling (Dzanku et al. 2020).
Medium-scale mills were established in the 1970s and 
early 1980s and are predominantly privately-owned by 
Ghanaians. A few of these mills have their own oil palm 
plantations of between 120 and 430ha. Thus, they 
rely heavily on supplies from independent smallholder 
farmers (Fold and Whitfield 2012). In general, their rate 
of extraction is less efficient than the estates, who use 
industrial-level equipment for extraction.
The large-scale mills are owned by the estate plantations, 
namely Ghana Oil Palm Development Corporation 
(GOPDC), Benso Oil Palm Plantation (BOPP), Twifo 
Oil Palm Plantation (TOPP), Ameen Sangari, Norpalm 
Ghana Limited, and Juaben Oil Mills. In 2010, the 
total combined annual output of the main processors 
was 432,844mt FFB. Just under a quarter of this was 
produced by GOPDC, with Ameen Sangari second 
with 92,000mt. At 29,000mt, Juaben processed the 
least amount of FFBs (MASDAR 2011: 2.7).
Ameen Sangari, the only private mill, is also the 
oldest, having started in 1919 in Cape Coast as 
a soap manufacturer. It started producing CPO 
and palm kernel oil (PKO) as raw materials for 
soap manufacturing, although as of 2010, it was 
sourcing over 88 per cent of FFB from independent 
smallholders. After many years of commercial 
struggles, in March 2020, it was permanently closed 
after staff staged a protest over unpaid salaries and 
redundancy packages (Amarteifio 2020).
By contrast, most of the estate mills started as state 
initiatives or as partnerships between the state and 
foreign investors. GOPDC was founded in 1975, as part 
of the government's attempt to diversify agricultural 
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production, while BOPP and TOPP were established in 
1976 and 1977 respectively as joint ventures between 
the government and investors. After structural 
adjustment, the state-owned estates were privatised. 
In 1995, Siat Group, of Belgium, acquired 60 per cent 
of GOPDC, while Unilever acquired 40 per cent of 
government shares in TOPP. Meanwhile, National Oil 
Palm Limited was acquired by Norpalm ASA, which 
established Norpalm Ghana Limited. BOPP is currently 
owned by Wilmar Africa (MASDAR 2011).
CPO and PKO can be refined into various palm oils 
and fats, and is used in the food, detergent, cosmetic, 
and chemical industries. In the food industry, it is used 
as an ingredient for biscuits, chocolate, cooking oil, 
ice cream, margarine, and mayonnaise. The kernel 
can be processed into meals for animal feed. Palm oil 
has other advanced industrial applications, such as 
oleo chemicals, pulp and paper, and butter fats, which 
Ghana has not yet developed the processing capacity 
for (Fold and Whitfield 2012; MASDAR 2011).
Currently, Unilever processes soap and cooking oil 
called Frytol, and GOPDC produces King Vegetable 
Oil. GOPDC has a refinery/fractionation plant, a 
biomethanation plant, and produces palm kernel cake 
pellets. Companies in Ghana who also have refinery and 
fractionation facilities include Unilever, PZ Cussons, and 
GOPDC (MASDAR 2011). These companies produce 
palm oil that meets international standards. Unilever is 
the largest buyer of CPO from the medium- and large-
scale mills for downstream processing of consumer 
products. However, Ghana does not produce enough 
CPO to meet industrial demand, hence, the country 
continues to be a net importer of CPO. Nevertheless, 
small quantities of Ghanaian CPO are exported to 
niche ethnic or organic markets in the US and Europe 
(executive of Artisanal Palm Oil, pers. comm. March 
2020; Fold and Whitfield 2012). 
4.2. Other actors
Transportation service providers, and agents or 
aggregators, perform integrative functions along the 
chain. Aggregators connect smallholder farmers to the 
large estates. Some aggregators are directly employed 
by the estates but many operate on their own account, 
deriving a small profit from the difference between the 
price they offer to farmers and the amount the mills 
pay for their fruits. Transportation is a crucial support 
service in the value chain. Oil palm cannot be stored 
for long because it starts losing moisture soon after 
harvesting, and the harvest must be transported for 
downstream-processing, or to home-consumption 
markets, as soon as possible. This is often hampered 
by the poor state of the roads in communities producing 
the crop, and negatively affects farmers’ income and 
generally impedes efforts at improving productivity 
(Heerink, Atsma and Fosu 1997). 
Policymakers are an influential set of actors who have 
enduring interests in the performance of the industry 
because of its contribution to the national economy. By 
setting the broad policy framework within which players 
along the value chain pursue their goals, policymakers 
are able to influence the performance of different 
actors in the value chain by shaping the distribution 
of incentives (such as subsidised seedlings) within the 
value chain. Therefore, they are able to influence which 
actors win, or lose, along the value chain.
The industry-wide association also plays a key role 
in improving the productivity of the value chain. 
The first such association, the Ghana Oil Palm 
Development Association (GOPDA), was inaugurated 
in 1985. In addition to promoting cooperation and 
information exchange among the dominant players, 
it also functioned as a mouth-piece for the actors in 
the value chain, and negotiated with government on 
behalf of actors in the value chain. In the early 1990s, 
it succeeded in influencing government’s decision to 
increase tariffs on imported vegetable oil and soaps, 
and also established a pricing formula, which priced 
FFBs at 10 per cent of factory gate price of CPO. 
However, the association started declining from the 
early 2000s, coinciding with the privatisation of major 
state-owned estates such as GOPDC and National Oil 
Palm Plantation Limited (NOPL) (MASDAR 2011). The 
large estates were the core of this association, but 
believing that the price-setting function of the GOPDA 
harmed their own interests, they felt constrained by the 
association (OPDAG Secretary pers. comm. March 
2020). With support from Busac Fund and Solidaridad, 
the association was revived in 2015 as the Oil Palm 
Development Association of Ghana (OPDAG) which 
pursued many of the same goals as GOPDA (executive 
of OPDAG, and officials of Solidaridad and Busac Fund 
pers. comm. March 2020). However, an important new 
objective of the association is ensuring environmental 
sustainability, as prescribed in the Roundtable on 
Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO) (OPDAG no date).
The international development community has also 
become directly or indirectly involved in the industry 
(see Hypothesis Five in the Appendix). These include 
the Commonwealth Development Corporation, 
European Union, World Bank, International Finance 
Corporation, African Development Bank, Nederlandse 
Financierings-Maatschappij voor Ontwikkelingslanden 
N.V., and Agence Française de Développement (AFD). 
AFD has a longstanding interest in rubber and oil palm 
in Ghana. In 1995, together with the World Bank, AFD 
provided a credit facility to the Ghanaian government 
to finance tree crops like oil palm and rubber, under 
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the Programme for the Promotion of Perennial Crops 
(PPPC), and has since supported oil palm and rubber 
outgrower schemes (Ambassade de France au Ghana 
2015). In 2006, AFD and Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau 
signed another credit facility with the government 
for the PPPC programme to run from 2006 to 2013 
(MoFA no date). However, an AFD official interviewed 
for this study complained that the PPPC was not used, 
even though they spent a lot of money developing 
it. For instance, a tree crop authority, similar to Tree 
Crop Development Authority (TCDA), was supposed 
to have been set up under the PPPC, but this did not 
happen. AFD currently has no ongoing oil palm project 
(interview AFD official on March 2020).
The Embassy of the Netherlands in Ghana has 
been involved in the oil palm value chain since 2012, 
providing support under the Sustainable West African 
Oil Palm Programme (SWAPP). The embassy is mainly 
interested in promoting private sector participation 
in the value chain and encouraging sustainable 
production. Currently, they are supporting the 
implementation of PERD by training district agricultural 
development officers in nursery management and 
best practices. CSOs active in the sector (such as 
Solidaridad), and other development agencies like AFD 
and KfW (official of the Embassy of the Netherlands 
pers. comm. March 2020).
Financial institutions, both domestic and donor-
related, have also continued to play influential roles 
in the workings of the value chain. Funding from the 
government and external sources can be accessed 
through the National Investment Bank (NIB) and the 
Agricultural Development Bank (ADB). Domestic 
sources of financial support for the industry have 
come from Ecobank Ghana, Barclays Bank, Merchant 
Bank, and the Social Security and National Insurance 
Trust (MASDAR 2011). 
As discussed above, civil society or non-governmental 
organisations (CSOs and NGOS) have also been active 
in the industry. These have usually worked closely with 
donor agencies to channel resources to actors within 
the industry, or to organise training. The Embassy 
of the Netherlands, for instance, supports OPDAG 
indirectly through Solidaridad (official of Embassy 
of the Netherlands pers. comm. March 2020). Since 
2012, Solidaridad has been involved in the value chain 
under the SWAPP, with funding from the Embassy of 
the Netherlands. They provide training to smallholders 
on best practices under the Roundtable for Sustainable 
Palm Oil (RSPO) (interviews with officials of the 
Embassy of the Netherlands and of Solidaridad, March 
2020). Proforest, another non-profit organisation, 
also supports sustainable production of agricultural 
commodities and works closely with the government, 
companies, and other CSOs involved in the value 
chain on the national interpretation of the RSPO 
(officials of Proforest pers. comm. March 2020). In line 
with their concern over environmental sustainability, 
they assist smallholders and artisanal millers to 
intensify production, in order to curb the exploitation 
of forest lands for expansion. They were instrumental 
in the revival of the industry association, the Oil Palm 
Development Association of Ghana (OPDAG), and 
worked closely with OPDAG and other stakeholders for 
the passing of the bill setting up TCDA (interview with 
official of Solidaridad, March 2020).
4.3. Challenges 
Due to the segmented nature of the value chain, 
smallholders and estates must confront distinctive 
sets of challenges. As noted above, smallholders 
lack access to improved planting materials and 
other inputs like fertilisers, a situation which severely 
constrains their productivity. This, in turn, ultimately 
lowers the productivity of the entire value chain, since 
smallholders account for such a large proportion 
of production. Policies for the past two decades 
have been focused on improving the productivity of 
smallholders. However, to date, these policies have 
failed to deliver the expected benefits. In the case 
of the President’s Special Initiative on Oil Palm (PSI-
Oil Palm), the failure resulted from poor coordination 
between the various government agencies involved 
in the implementation of the programme, as well as 
struggles between competing factions of the ruling 
party that further reduced the administrative coherence 
and effectiveness of the programme (Asante 2012). 
Access to farmland for smallholder farmers is becoming 
an increasingly complicated issue. Tenure insecurities 
arising from ownership disputes is an established 
problem confronting smallholders. However, since the 
deregulations and market liberalisation that followed in 
the wake of structural adjustment in the 1980s, large-
scale land acquisitions facilitated by local chiefs has 
intensified land dispossession and tenure insecurities 
across the country, and sub-Saharan Africa (Tsikata 
and Yaro 2013). 
The industrial segment of the value chain faces its own 
sets of challenges. The lack of litigation-free land poses 
a serious problem to any attempt to expand production. 
According to the MoFA-commissioned masterplan, up 
to 50,000ha parcels of lands ‘are potentially available’ in 
the Western and Central Regions for the establishment 
or expansion of plantations. However, the intricacies 
of land tenure and access arrangements, with long 
and drawn-out litigations, often present  investors 
with substantial challenges (Amanor, Yaro and Teye 
2020; Yaro, Teye and Torvikey 2018; MASDAR 2011). 
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For an outsider, the landholding arrangement can seem 
confusing, as described by Fold and Whitfield:
In short, land cannot be easily bought and sold. 
Acquiring large pieces of land involves a long process 
of negotiations with landowners, chiefs, people 
on the land, as well as compensation for the land, 
people on the land and structures on the land. And 
even after compensation is paid, new claims might 
arise (Whitfield and Fold 2012: 12).
Even for the well-established estates, the land question 
is not fully settled. Since most of these began as state-
owned enterprises, on land forcefully expropriated by 
the state, decades-long litigations and compensation 
demands are common, even after the estates have been 
transferred to private hands. As a conciliatory measure, 
the estates have had to devise schemes to assuage 
the resentment of communities who were affected by 
government expropriation. For instance, GOPDC has a 
smallholder scheme that incorporates those who would, 
have otherwise, been displaced (Fold and Whitfield 2012).
The industrial-use sector often faces unstable or 
unreliable supply of FFBs, because they have to 
compete with the market for home-consumption. 
To meet the shortfall, the estates enter into different 
arrangements with smallholders to supply them with 
FFBs. Nucleus smallholder and outgrower schemes 
are examples of these arrangements. But contract 
violations, including side-selling, is rampant among 
smallholders. The situation is so bad that some 
estates, like BOPP, avoid contracts altogether, even to 
farmers under their outgrower schemes, because such 
contracts are no guarantee against side-selling (BOPP 
manager pers. comm. March 2019). On their part, 
smallholders greatly distrust contracts, even though 
studies have shown that farmers under contract 
are better off than their counterparts cultivating 
independently (Ruml and Qaim 2020).
Attention is now being increasingly directed at the 
environmental impact of oil palm production. Globally, 
expansion in oil palm cultivation has been linked to growing 
deforestation, as virgin forests are cut down to make way 
for plantation development, in the process contributing 
to the destruction of rainforests and loss of biodiversity. 
In addition, there are hazardous effects on humans, as 
runoff from agro-chemicals and effluents from industrial 
mills drain into water bodies which serve as sources 
of drinking water (Opoku and Asante 2008). NGOs like 
Solidaridad and Proforest, and development partners 
like AFD and the Embassy of the Netherlands, have been 
helping producers to meet international sustainability 
standards as enshrined in the RSPO (officials of AFD, the 
Embassy of the Netherlands, Solidaridad, and Proforest 
pers. comm. March 2020).
Finally, the wider policy context presents problems 
which affect the performance of the value chain. 
Although government policy since the early 2000s has 
tended to be supportive of agricultural development, 
and the oil palm sector in particular, the politics of 
policymaking has often limited the transformative 
potential of such policies. For instance, former 
president, John Kufuor, established the President’s 
Special Initiatives in August 2001 shortly after 
ascending to power. However, despite PSI-Oil Palm 
being instituted in full view of the presidency and its 
constitutionally-guaranteed powers, it ultimately failed. 
This is partly because of power struggles between 
government agencies and ruling party factions that 
hampered its implementation. The programme directed 
most of its benefits to independent smallholders, 
even though the large estates were meant to play a 
central role in supporting the programme. Tensions 
about the programme emerged during a consultation 
workshop between government and stakeholders in 
2004, shortly before the programme was rolled out, 
leading to the eventual withdrawal of the estates from 
the programme (Asante 2012). The holding power of 
the estates was demonstrated by the fact that not only 
did they survive without the support of the PSI-Oil Palm 
programme, but that their withdrawal eventually led to 
the termination of the programme.
Actors in the value chain have long called for government 
protection from cheap imports of vegetable oil. In recent 
times, governments’ reduction of the benchmark value 
of imported edible oils have generated serious concern 
among actors in the value chain. Local producers, both 
artisanal and industrial, complained that the situation 
made locally-produced vegetable oils uncompetitive, 
and that failure to reverse the policy could trigger 
massive unemployment. On this issue, their interests are 
at odds with the Ghana Union of Traders’ Associations, 
an extremely influential group for mostly urban-based 
traders. The large size of Ghana’s informal economy 
makes the association powerful actor in local market 
regulation and import policies. Consequently, the 
government is reluctant to introduce policies likely to 
antagonise them because of the negative implications 
towards election results that could happen by upsetting 
a potential voting bloc (manager of GOPDC, official of the 
Embassy of the Netherlands, and executives of Artisanal 
Palm Oil and OPDAG pers. comm. March 2020; Bentil 
2019). A series of errors occurred in May 2020 when 
the government had to quickly reverse an announced 
exemption of vegetable oils from benchmark reduction, 
even after OPDAG had publicly praised the government 
on the move (B&FT 2020). However, this information 
was surreptitiously communicated to OPDAG to 
avoid embarrassment to the government (executives 
Artisanal Palm Oil, OPDAG pers. comm. May 2020).
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Inclusive value chain analysis is motivated by inclusive 
ideals (i.e. poverty reduction, empowerment, and 
reducing inequality), but it is often limited by a tendency 
to identify all non-plantation farmers in a homogenous 
‘smallholder’ or ‘peasant’ category. This is an important 
conceptual limitation, because failure to acknowledge 
the heterogeneity among smallholders could result in 
a situation of ‘adverse incorporation’ (Hickey and Du 
Toit 2013). This would affect the most disadvantaged 
actors in the value chain, whose fortunes remain either 
unchanged, or may actually decline, because benefits 
tend to be unequally distributed in favour of those who 
already possess more power or resources (Manley and 
Van Leynseele 2019). 
As explained above, Ghana’s oil palm industry is 
largely split into two branches, with the main lines of 
social difference defined by peasant production or 
production for the global market (industrial processing). 
Beyond this broad categorisation, smallholder 
farmers differ on the bases of their mode of market 
participation and livelihood outcomes. Manley and Van 
Leynseele (2019) identifies four types of smallholders 
based on mode of market participation, as expressed 
in their contractual relations and participation in the 
estate/global or artisanal (or Kramer) markets. Among 
contract farmers, they distinguish between ‘faithful’ 
contract farmers, who possess enough prior assets, 
and for whom contractual attachment to the estates 
is a better alternative to participating in the ‘Kramer’ 
market. They also describe the ‘unfaithful’ contract 
farmers, who only attach themselves to the estates 
out of necessity (to acquire inputs or access to land), 
and who are often dissatisfied about their contract 
terms. Between these two types of contract farmers, 
the ‘faithful’ farmers are better off in terms of income 
and wellbeing (see also Dzanku et al. 2020). By 
contrast, independent farmers can be categorised into 
‘free choice’ and ‘marginalised’ farmers. In general, 
independent farmers tend to earn much less than 
both categories of contract farmers, but marginalised 
farmers are the worst-off category. For instance, their 
off-farm activities are geared more towards meeting 
livelihood needs than on on-farm investments. 
These social differences overlap with, and sometimes 
complicate, existing social inequalities in access to 
resources and power. For instance, because women 
tend to lack secure access to land, they are less likely 
than similarly-endowed men to enter into contractual 
arrangements with the estates (Dzanku et al. 2020), 
which is premised on the assumption of tenure security. 
At the household level, control of oil palm farms tends 
to be vested in males. The division of labour on farms 
also tends to be heavily gendered, with men performing 
tasks like land preparation, planting, weeding, pruning 
and harvesting while women tend to assist with 
nursery management, handle rodent control, and carry 
harvested fruits (Ofosu-Budu and Sarpong 2013: 364). 
When labour is sourced from outside the family, men 
benefit from the unequal remuneration of gendered 
tasks involved in cultivating and harvesting the crop. 
Further, artisanal processing is female-dominated, 
although the machinery tends to be owned by men 
(Ofosu-Budu and Sarpong 2013).
Growing land scarcity, partly fueled by large-
scale agricultural land deals following the entry of 
multinational capital in the sector after structural 
adjustment (Yaro, Teye and Torvikey 2018: 60) has 
exacerbated the problem. This is because it has 
further entrenched existing inequalities in the ruthless 
competition for access to available land in which “the 
powerful displace the weak”. This process is underway 
across different crop value chains, as observed by 
Amanor and colleagues (Amanor, Yaro and Teye 2020: 
25): “the youth are increasingly dependent upon elders 
for land, while elders compete among themselves 
for control of land and family labour. Both youth and 
women/wives are no longer guaranteed easy access 
to land”. A recent study in oil palm growing villages in 
the Ashanti and Central Regions report that access to 
land is influenced by a combination of one’s personal 
networks, local political connections, and gender 
(Khatun et al. 2020).
Finally, these differences also structure how benefits 
and costs of global initiatives such as the RSPO, 
are unequally distributed among value chain actors. 
Khatun et al. (2020: 2) have demonstrated that the 
“universalising logics of certification” risks worsen the 
livelihoods of the most vulnerable actors in the value 
chain – women farmers, millers, and traders – who 
may be have to bear the brunt of compliance even 
5 SOCIAL DIFFERENCE WITHIN THE CHAIN
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though they do not directly participate in the global 
market (see also Castellanos-Navarrete and Jansen 
2018). And with a large unmet local and sub-regional 
demand, many smallholders do not seem keen to 
acquire RSPO certification. According to a smallholder 
farmers’ representative, they only participate in NGO-
organised sustainability workshops in order to collect 
the Wellington boots and other goods distributed at 
such events (interview with executive of Artisanal Palm 
Oil, May 2020).
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6.1. From early independence to  
period of crisis 
By independence in 1957, the old oil palm belt had 
disappeared, and Ghana was a net importer of palm 
oil. The newly independent government of Kwame 
Nkrumah embarked on an aggressive agenda to revive 
the oil palm economy as part of a broader strategy of 
import substitution. Because palm oil constituted an 
important ingredient in dishes in southern Ghana, the 
large volumes of palm and other oil imports imposed 
a heavy constraint on the economy (Fold and Whitfield 
2012; Gyasi 1992). In 1964, OPRI was established 
to, among other things, conduct scientific research 
into oil palm development and to supply improved 
seedlings to cultivators. 
Post-independence governments differed from their 
colonial predecessors by the careful attention they 
paid to oil palm and their direct involvement in it. Efforts 
to promote the oil palm industry were streamlined into 
broader national development plans and strategy 
documents by post-independence governments. 
These included the five-year development plan (1959–
1964), the seven-year plan (1964-70), the two-year plan 
(1969-71), the five-year plan (1975–1980), the Structural 
Adjustment Programme (1982–1992), Vision 2020, 
and the Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy I and II. 
These efforts have been geared towards expanding 
production and processing capacities, poverty 
reduction and employment creation, reducing the 
overreliance on cocoa, gold, and timber, and economic 
transformation by attracting large capital investment 
into the oil palm sector (MASDAR 2011: 1.2). 
The actual implementation of oil palm industry-
specific policies were shaped by ideological, strategic, 
and partisan or factional considerations. The statist 
approach of the Nkrumah government stood out 
starkly against the hands-off approach adopted by the 
colonial regime for most of its tenure. And while the 
colonial regime was mainly interested in enhancing the 
export revenue generated by the industry, Nkrumah’s 
government followed an import substitution strategy 
aimed at satisfying domestic household consumption 
as well as industrial needs. In pursuit of these goals, the 
State Farms Corporation and independent producers 
were supported to increase the area under cultivation. 
In 1962, the State Farms owned only one of five small 
mills, but by 1987, this has increased to four state-
operated estates in Prestea, Sese, Kwamoso, and 
Asesewa (MASDAR 2011: 1.3).
After Nkrumah’s overthrow in 1966, economic policy 
alternated between protectionism and outward 
orientation. The market-oriented government of Kofi 
Busia (1969–1972) kept the state-owned enterprises 
formed under the Nkrumah government, but policy 
orientation shifted from import substitution to 
production for export. During this period, the State 
Farms Corporation established new plantations and 
expanded processing capacity. However, the Busia 
government was short-lived, and Ghana continued 
to import vegetable oil to meet the domestic shortfall 
until his successor, General Acheampong, sought to 
reverse the situation with the Five-Year Development 
Plan (1975–1980), which resulted in the establishment of 
three large estates, namely Benso Oil Palm Plantations 
Limited (BOPP), Ghana Oil Palm Development 
Corporation (GOPDC), and TOPP (MASDAR 2011). This 
also involved a reversal from the market orientation of 
the Busia government. 
A combination of political and economic crises in the 
late 1970s resulted in the dramatic rise of a young Flt 
Lt Jerry John Rawlings, who by 1981 had successfully 
carried out two coups d'etat. Although initially 
espousing a strong marxist ideology, the extreme 
economic crises of the early 1980s forced him to 
quickly reverse course and adopt economic recovery 
and structural adjustment programme (ERP and SAP) 
policies (Teye and Torvikey 2018; Boafo-Arthur 1999). 
The oil palm industry received a boost under the push 
towards economic liberalisation policies in the 1980s. 
The decade saw the consolidation of the models 
implemented in the previous decades, the rehabilitation 
and expansion of existing plantations by the State 
Farms Corporations, including the incorporation of 
estates at Pretsea/Sese as the National Oil Palm 
Limited (NOPL) as a commercial entity (MASDAR 
2011). The 1990s witnessed an aggressive drive to 
divest government interests in oil palm production, 
so that by 2007, government had privatised nearly all 
the State Farms plantations, including GOPDC, BOPP, 
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TOPP, and NOPL (Appiah-Kubi 2001). In 2007, Appiah 
Menkah Complex Limited acquired the last oil palm 
asset of the State Farms Corporations (MASDAR 2011). 
In spite of these reforms, the industry was still unable 
to satisfy domestic demand by the turn of the twenty-
first century. In 2003, the government of John Kufuor 
initiated a grand support programme, dubbed the PSI-
Oil Palm, under the direct control of the presidency in 
a bid to expand production. However, the overall result 
was disappointing, and the programme terminated 
before the end of his tenure as a result of a combination 
of factors, including funding constraints, and lack 
of administrative coordination between government 
agencies responsible for implementation (Asante 2012; 
Fold and Whitfield 2012).
A key insight from this brief historical account is that, 
the active interest of post-independence governments 
in promoting the oil palm industry notwithstanding, 
the broad policy environment was marked by political 
instability. One major source of this instability was 
the numerous military interventions that the country 
experienced. Between 1966, when the Nkrumah 
government was overthrown, and 1980, when the 
Hilla Limann government was toppled, the military 
had overthrown five governments, three of them 
democratically elected. And it was not until 2001 that 
the country experienced its first transition of power 
from one democratically elected government to 
another. These frequent abrupt changes of government 
affected the implementation of broad development 
plans, including specific policies targeting the oil palm 
sector. For instance, after the 1966 coup, the seven-
year development plan of Nkrumah was abandoned, 
as was the two-year plan of Busia when he was 
overthrown (MASDAR 2011). 
In addition to political instability, policy implementation 
was also hampered by weakened state capacity 
resulting from factional politics and the use of state 
agencies as a vehicle to reward political supporters. 
The resulting corruption and mismanagement 
undermined efforts to promote the value chain (Gyasi 
1992). Together with the ever-present problem of 
inadequate financial resources, which grew worse in 
the 1970s, these factors effectively frustrated Ghana’s 
efforts to produce enough palm oil to meet the 
domestic demand. Thus, the shift towards privatisation 
in the industry was embraced by stakeholders, with the 
expectation that by ceding space to the private sector, 
the industry would finally enter a phase of rapid growth.
6.2. After adjustment: the politics of a 
new era?
Following the economic crisis of the late 1970s and early 
1980s, Ghana was forced to undergo thoroughgoing 
economic reforms as a precondition for aid. The 
structural reforms of the 1980s championed by the 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
proved successful; in fact, surprisingly so, according 
to scholars like Boafo-Arthur (1999), given that the 
country simultaneously embarked on a democratic 
transition while implementing draconian structural 
adjustment policies. However, the inauguration of the 
Fourth Republic in January 1993 radically shortened 
the time-horizon of the Rawlings regime (Whitfield 
2011a) and increased the number of actors vying for 
rent by opening up the political arena to erstwhile 
excluded actors into the policy process (Resnick 
2016; Boafo-Arthur 1999). Although the democratic 
transition was widely expected to usher in a new era 
of politics and development, it has widely failed to 
meet expectations. Analysts argue that it has instead 
reinforced patronage politics under the pressure of 
electoral calculations. The result is a political settlement 
which scholars describe as ‘competitive clientelism’, in 
which elections are meaningful because they routinely 
lead to peaceful transitions, but have little impact on 
the deeply entrenched system of patronage, extractive 
corruption, or the politics of impunity (Asante and 
Khisa 2019; Appiah and Abdulai 2017; Whitfield 2011a). 
Even though democratisation increased the range of 
actors in the political arena, they were not all equally 
successful in influencing policy. In fact, a paradoxical 
situation emerged: even though the logic of economic 
liberalisation mandated an active role of the private 
sector in the economy, government-business relations 
remained frosty throughout the Rawling era spanning 
the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) 
(1981–1992) and the National Democratic Congress 
(NDC) (1993–2000) governments. This hostility derived 
from the strongly Marxist bent of the early PNDC 
regime, but the government also harboured suspicions 
that private wealth can be used to finance its 
opponents (Whitfield 2011a; Tangri 1992). On the other 
hand, the imperative to win elections strengthened 
both horizontal factions of political parties – who can 
mobilise monetary and other resources to sponsor 
electoral campaigns – and lower level factions (referred 
to as foot soldiers or vigilantes in Ghanaian political 
colloquialism) – who perform a variety of street-level 
tasks including canvassing of votes and protection 
against harassment or intimidation from political 
opponents, or inflicting this themselves (Khan 2005). 
This situation where genuinely competitive democratic 
politics exacerbates, rather than reduces, the use of 
patronage as an instrument of power-preservation is 
referred to as ‘competitive clientelism’. The pressures 
of this competitive-clientelist logic was so strong that in 
spite of the New Patriotic Party’s (NPP) strong market-
leaning ideology, organised business interests did not 
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fare any better under the Kufuor government (2001–
2008) than they did under Rawlings (Whitfield 2011b).
However, external actors, including the World Bank, 
IMF, and other development partners have continued 
to be important stakeholders in the policymaking 
process owing to their financial and technical support 
for government policies and programmes (Teye and 
Torvikey 2018). Accordingly, agricultural policies 
since 2001 have borne the fingerprint of international 
development agencies and are designed to coincide 
with the prevailing development narratives. In 
response to the priorities of programmes overseen 
by donors such as the  Foreign, Commonwealth and 
Development Office, International Fund for Agricultural 
Development, GIZ, the World Bank, and United States 
Agency for International Development, agricultural 
policies have been designed to address issues of 
food security, rural poverty, provision of infrastructure, 
as well as input subsidy and marketing support. The 
ideological basis for these programmes strongly 
favoured a public-private partnerships strategy. The 
fact that it coincided with electoral calculation partly 
explains why they have remained constant elements 
of the agricultural policies of both NPP and NDC 
governments (Teye and Torvikey 2018: 18–19).
Thus, in spite of the aggressive reduction of the role 
of the state in the economy in the 1980s, the 1990s 
witnessed new forms of state interventionism involving 
massive capital investment. Many of these policies had 
explicit poverty reduction and rural development goals. 
For instance, the goals of the Medium Term Agricultural 
Development Programme (1991–2000) included crop 
productivity as well as developing marketing systems 
and rural infrastructural development. From 2001, 
policies have sought to, among other things, supply 
raw materials for domestic industrialisation or promote 
commodity chains of selected export crops (FASDEP 
I and II 2002; Tree Crop Strategy 2012), supply inputs 
like improved seeds or fertilisers (National Fertiliser and 
Seed Policies 2010), promote food security and poverty 
reduction (FASDEP I and II; Medium Term Agricultural 
Sector Investment Plan [METASIP I and II] 2011–2015), 
and encouraging private sector participation (GCAP 
2012; Teye and Torvikey 2018: 19–20).
The actual implementation of these policies have often 
been mired in the logic of electoral calculations. For 
instance, the fertiliser subsidy programme introduced 
in 2008, in response to the global food and energy 
price hikes, was supposed to be limited (targeting 
beneficiaries using vouchers) and time-limited 
(Banful 2009). However, not only did the programme 
continue beyond its intended end date, but it was 
expanded in scope from a targeted to a universal 
subsidy programme because of the fear that ending 
it would hurt the government’s electoral polls. It is a 
testament to the force of the electoral imperative that 
the programme has continued across the tenure of 
four presidents (John Kufuor, John Atta Mills, John 
Mahama, Nana Akufo Addo). Moreover, a study 
by the International Food Policy Research Institute 
discovered that under the voucher system, allocation 
was manipulated to favour districts where the ruling 
party had lost in the previous elections (Banful 2011), 
thus, turning the policy into a patronage tool.
6.3. Oil palm specific policies since 
2000
Sector specific policies have aimed to boost output 
through both extensification (by increasing the area 
under production) and intensification (by increasing the 
yield per ha) of cultivation. Early policy initiatives were 
geared towards easing the constraints on the country’s 
foreign exchange reserves by reducing imports bill 
(see Hypothesis Three in the Appendix), as well as 
capturing the Economic Community of West African 
States market, where unmet demand in 2004 was 
estimated at 850,000mt (cited in Opoku and Asante 
2008, Toledano et al. 2004). Under the Food and 
Agricultural Sector Development Policy programme, 
the government sought to promote the cultivation 
of improved seeds and to expand the processing 
capacity of artisanal mills.
In 2003, when the PSI-Oil Palm was launched, there 
was optimism about its potential for success given that 
it was under the direct oversight of the most powerful 
political office. The aim of the PSI-Oil Palm was to 
expand production enough to meet the domestic 
and sub-regional demand. To meet this objective, the 
government was to support the OPRI to expand its 
capacity for producing planting materials. To expand 
the area under cultivation, groups of farmers were to 
be organised to cultivate 5000ha plantations with a 
20t FFB/h mill established on-site with the help of the 
private sector. The ultimate aim of the initiative was to 
bring 200,000ha under cultivation (Adjei-Nsiah, Sakyi-
Dawson and Kuyper 2012; Opoku and Asante 2008: 18). 
As part of the initiative, the government devised a 
corporate village enterprise (COVE) model under 
which smallholders would control majority shares 
in processing mills linked to the PSI-Oil Palm farms 
but whose day-to-day administration was under 
professional management. The PSI-Oil Palm was 
able to add about 20,000ha of oil palm to the national 
stock (MASDAR 2011), but fell far short of its intended 
200,000ha. This model did not take off because 
of the heavy smallholder leaning of the PSI, and 
the dissatisfaction of private sector actors over the 
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design and emphasis of the initiative. Instead of the 
COVE model, estates had wanted the PSI-Oil Palm 
to strengthen the connection between independent 
smallholders and company mills (Asante 2012). This 
tension was inevitable because the bifurcated nature 
of the value chain made it almost impossible to satisfy 
both sectors using the same policy. This was further 
exacerbated by the fact the policy was meant to satisfy 
two incompatible goals:
1. reducing the import bill by boosting local 
production of edible oils, a policy which required 
that government prioritises the industrial 
processing stream of the value chain; and
2. reducing rural poverty by boosting smallholder 
production, which the COVE model sought to 
attain by empowering smallholders to produce 
and process their fruits on a large-scale.
In the end, the estates withdrew from the programme 
over these disagreements. The fact that the PSI-Oil 
Palm eventually collapsed without the support of the 
estates (Asante 2012) demonstrates the holding power 
that these estates wield in terms of policies affecting 
how the chain operates.
The PSI-Oil Palm was also severely affected by inter-
agency coordination issues and factional struggles 
within the ruling NPP party. The identification of 
the programme with Alan Kyeremanteng and the 
Ministry of Trade and Industry made other agencies, 
in particular MoFA, hesitate to give it the support it 
needed. Kyeremanteng, was widely considered “the 
political power behind the PSIs programme” (Asante 
2012: 25). After he was made Minister for Trade and 
Industry, the programme was moved from the direct 
supervision of the president’s Chief of Staff to his 
ministry. It then briefly came under the supervision 
of Kwamena Bartels, the minister for Private Sector 
Development, when it was moved to his ministry. A 
cabinet reshuffled later reassigned Kyeremanteng to 
the ministry for Private Sector Development, which 
Table 6.1 Summary of Ghana’s political and economic regimes
Date Government Type Economic/political stance
1957–1966 Dr K. Nkrumah, Convention 
People’s Party (CPP)
Civilian (Starting in 1960) Socialist; inward-looking; 
protectionist; high levels of public spending and 
establishment of state owned enterprises. 
1966–1967 Col. A. Afrifa/ Gen. E. Kotoka, 
National Liberation Council (NLC)
Military Renounced socialist orientation; austere, tentative 
steps towards liberalisation.
1969–1972 Dr. K. A. Busia, Progress Party (PP) Civilian Market oriented; stronger moves towards 
liberalisation; attempted large devaluation.
1972–1977 Gen. I. Acheampong, National 
Redemption Council (NRC)
Military Inward-looking; protectionist; reversal of the Busia 
devaluate.
1975–1978 Gen. I. Acheampong, Supreme 
Military Council I (SMC I)
Military Inward-looking; protectionist.
1978–1979 Gen. F.W.K. Akuffo, Supreme 
Military Council II (SMC II)
Military Inward-looking; protectionist.
1979 Ft. Lt. J.J. Rawlings, Armed Forces 
Revolutionary Council (AFRC)
Military Some reforms but a general tightening of economic 
controls.
1979–1981 Dr. Hilla Limann (PNP) Civilian No real change.
1981–1992 Fl. Lt. J.J. Rawlings, Provisional 
National Defence Council (PNDC)
Military Initially a tightening of controls; from April 1983, 
outward-oriented economic recovery programme 
and adjustment (ERP).
1993–1996 Fl. Lt. J.J. Rawlings, National 
Democratic Congress (NDC)
Civilian 4th Republic; continuation of ERP, privatisation and 
divestiture; no regular opposition in Government/
Parliament.
1997 -2000 Fl. Lt. J.J. Rawlings (NDC) Civilian 2nd Election, 4th Republic; minority parties 
participate in election; market orientation.
2001–2008 John Agyekum Kufuor (NPP) Civilian Multi-party democracy (two terms), market 
orientation.
2009–2012 Prof. John Atta-Mills (NDC) Civilian Multi-party democracy; market orientation.
2013–2016 John Dramani Mahama (NDC) Civilian Multi-party democracy; market orientation.
Since 2017 Nana Addo Danquah Akufo Addo 
(NPP)
Civilian Multi-party democracy; mixture of market 
orientation and heavy social spending by 
government.
Source: adapted from Fosu and Aryeetey (2017)
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was later restructured into the influential Ministry for 
Trade and Industry, Private Sector Development, and 
President’s Special Initiatives (MOTI, PSD, and PSIs). 
Because the programme was so strongly associated 
with Kyeremanteng, other government agencies who 
were supposed to support it were either resistant or, 
like MoFA, “they hardly embraced the programme 
because the Ministry had not been [officially] invited to 
participate in PSIs” (Asante 2012: 28).
Its smooth functioning was also strongly influenced 
by the political clout of officials attached to it. The first 
National Coordinator of the PSI-Oil Palm was able 
direct mobilise funds from the President Kufuor’s Chief 
of Staff, Kwadwo Mpiani, but his successor, who was 
much less influential and, unable to raise the funds 
needed to continue implementation, ended up merely 
“holding the fort” until the programme was eventually 
dissolved by Kyeremanteng (Asante 2019: 28).
When the NDC came back to power in 2009, MoFA 
commissioned a master plan for the development 
of the oil palm sector. The report, prepared by 
MASDAR, proposed seven different projects with 
a detailed implementation plan between 2012 and 
2025. The proposed projects were 1) establishment 
of 10,000ha nucleus estate and 60tph mill plantation 
company; 2) 40,000ha Smallholders Development 
Scheme including a smallholder Services Entity 
and a Road Maintenance Fund; 3) Village Level 
Replanting Programme (110,000ha); 4) Small-Scale 
Mills Transformation Programme; 5) industrial palm 
oil-based manufacturing projects; 6) support services 
and industries; and 7) basic supportive infrastructure 
(MASDAR 2011: 7.1–2). However, this plan was not 
implemented. A high-ranking official at MoFA explained 
that funding constraints was a significant reason for the 
master plan not to materialise (interview with official of 
Tree Crop Services directorate of MoFA). But other 
respondents attributed the failure to implement the 
plan to the tendency for certain policy interventions 
to become too closely identified with the minister or 
politician who initiated them (officials at MoFA, pers. 
comm. March 2020), with the consequence that once 
they exit from office, their successors are not as keen 
to follow through with those policies. 
When the NPP came back to power in 2017, MoFA 
launched a flagship programme called Planting for 
Food and Jobs. Launched on 19 April 2017, the 
policy is broadly aimed at job creation and poverty 
reduction in the agricultural sector by promoting food 
production, as well as a reduction of the country’s food 
import bill (MoFA 2019a: 9). To achieve these goals, 
the programme is structured around 5 pillars, namely 
1) subsidised improved seeds, 2) subsidised fertilisers, 
3) reliable and routine technical assistance through 
extension services, 4) improving market linkages to 
abate price volatility, and 5) improved targeting and 
surveillance through the use of e-agriculture. Most of 
these pillars, specifically 1, 2, 4, and 5 would be built 
on a foundation of public-private partnership (MoFA 
2017b: 13–14). The programme targeted seven food 
crops (maize, rice, sorghum, tomato, onion, chilli 
pepper, and soya bean) ‘based on their contribution 
to national socioeconomic importance’ (MoFA 2017: 
18). The Planting for Food and Jobs campaign (PFJ) 
is intended to support the One District One Factory 
initiative, another ambitious plan of the government to 
accelerate industrialisation, by feeding factories with 
raw materials for downstream processing.
On 23 April 2019, the president launched PERD as 
a programme under the Tree Crop Module of PFJ, 
to be jointly implemented by MoFA and the Ministry 
of Local Government and Rural Development. The 
programme focuses on up to nine tree crops with 
historical or potential export records, namely cashew, 
coffee, oil palm, coconut, mango, citrus, cotton, shea, 
and rubber, in an effort to diversify the tree crop export 
sector away from cocoa (GoG [Government of Ghana], 
no date). However, each district is eligible to submit 
only two crops to be developed, after first making 
sure that the crops meet three crucial criteria of 1) 
ecological adaptability, 2) economic competitiveness, 
and 3) socio-cultural acceptability. At the beginning of 
each year, every district is expected to submit to its 
programme office the expected number of seedlings 
the district can raise (MoFA 2019b). Smallholder farmers 
are the main beneficiaries of the PERD programme, 
although the government plans to include some of the 
dominant players in executing some of the elements 
of the programme. For instance, in the Ahanta West 
Municipality, there is a planned partnership with 
Norpalm Ghana Limited to raise and supply farmers 
with improved seedlings.
Following the passage of the Tree Crop Development 
Act in December 2019, the tree crop sector is set to 
witness major changes. The act established the TCDA, 
which will be the governing body for the country’s 
tree crops sub-sector. Stakeholders in the oil palm 
value chain had been lobbying for years for a national 
regulatory body of this sort, but the government 
decided to create a four-crop authority instead 
(executive of OPDAG, researchers at Solidaridad 
and ProForest, pers. comm. March 2020). Actors 
in the industrial use segment of the value chain and 
representatives of the artisanal segment, as well as 
NGOs active within it, have all expressed optimism that 
the TCDA will provide needed regulations (regarding 
issues like environmental impact and pricing) and help 
solve longstanding problems constraining growth in 
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the industry (executives of executives of Artisanal Palm 
Oil and OPDAG, pers comm. March and May 2020, 
and with researchers at Solidaridad and Proforest, and 
officials at MoFA, March and May 2020). The TCDA 
should have been operational by the end of the first 
quarter of 2020, but has been delayed owing to the 
disruptions caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.
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Ghana, like other countries, has undergone massive 
disruptions since recording its first two cases of 
COVID-19 on 12 March 2020. On 30 March 2020, three 
Ghanaian cities were placed under a partial lockdown 
for three weeks. Other restrictions on public gatherings 
continue to be in place, but on 31 May, the president 
announced a gradual easing of these restrictions, 
which would allow public gatherings of not more than 
100 people. However, the country’s borders remain 
closed. To mitigate the impact of the pandemic, the 
government announced the Coronavirus Alleviation 
Programme in May 2020, which provides a GH¢ 1 
billion stimulus package for industry and citizens which 
aimed to, among other things, safeguard jobs, protect 
livelihoods, support small businesses, and promote 
selected industries. There is not yet a definite measure 
of the scale of the impact of the pandemic, and how 
different sectors of the economy have been affected. 
To contribute to filling this gap, this section draws on in-
depth interviews and a rapid market survey conducted 
in May and June 2020 to examine the impact of 
COVID-19 on the oil palm value chain.
The impact of the pandemic has affected the entire oil 
palm value chain. At the global level, weak demand 
and falling oil prices as a result of the pandemic 
led to falling world food prices (UN 2020). The FAO 
Vegetable Oil Price Index dropped from 139.0 points 
to 131.8 (5.2 per cent) between March and April 
2020. The international price of CPO has consistently 
declined during the pandemic – from US$730/t in 
January 2020 to US$550/t in April (Asian Crude Palm 
Oil Watch 1Q20 2020) – because weak demand was 
exacerbated by production from Malaysia exceeding 
initial projections (FAO 2020).
The impact of the drop in world market prices have 
been felt most directly by the estates who engage 
directly on the world market, but other actors along 
the chain have also been affected. These companies, 
who participate directly in the global market, were 
compelled to substantially reduce operations. They 
could no longer afford to buy FFBs because of the 
drop in world prices for CPO, leading to a drop in 
farmgate prices (executive of Artisanal Palm Oil, pers. 
comm. May 2020). Even so, Wilmar was the only 
company able to buy CPO (interview with executive 
of OPDAG, May 2020). This slow-down also affected 
transporters of CPO, who had to queue for days before 
offloading, owing to pressure on Wilmar as the sole 
buyer (executive of OPDAG, pers. comm. May 2020).
In addition to falling prices of FFBs, access to both local 
and regional markets have been severely constrained. 
With regards to the local market, restrictions on public 
gatherings and closure of eateries decreased demand 
for palm oil, resulting in a price reduction. In May 2020, 
a 25kg gallon of oil was sold at GH¢55, a reduction from 
the pre-pandemic price of about GH¢80. The closure 
of schools has also seriously affected small millers 
who, since the introduction of the current government’s 
Free Senior High School policy, had enjoyed constant 
demand for their products (rapid market survey, May 
and June 2020; executive of Artisanal Palm Oil, pers. 
comm. May 2020).
The estates and better-resourced actors in the artisanal 
segment of the value chain are also no longer able to 
access the sub-regional market because of border 
closures as a measure to restrict the spread of the virus 
(rapid market survey, May and June 2020; executive 
of Artisanal Palm Oil, pers. comm. May 2020). Even 
though Nigerian land borders had been closed since 
August 2019 in order to prevent the smuggling of rice 
(Orjinmo 2019), the estates were still able to access 
the Nigerian market by channelling exports through 
the ports, a situation which is now impossible due to 
COVID-19 related restrictions (executive of OPDAG, 
pers. comm. May 2020).
Data from the rapid market survey suggests that 
the impact of the pandemic on labour arrangements 
along the chain appears mixed. The agri-businesses 
surveyed had a minimum of 17 and maximum of 150 
workers, and although some had been compelled to 
lay-off up to three-quarters of employees because 
of reduced operations, others were struggling to 
meet their labour needs. Labour shortage is a result 
of the importance of migrants as farm workers. A 
combination of movement restrictions, and fear 
of contracting the virus by commuting, markedly 
reduced the flow of migrant workers. However, one 
respondent reported that because many workplaces 
are now closed, he has access to a pool of labour that 
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was otherwise employed, or hitherto unwilling to take 
up on-farm employment.
Farmers and processors along the chain have been 
forced to substantially scale down on production, with 
many reducing the amounts of inputs they sourced by 
at least a half. For instance, an artisanal miller who used 
to source between 35t and 40t of FFBs a week was 
now getting not more than 16t. The revenue losses are 
also equally substantial, from a minimum of GH¢4,000 
to as much as GH¢400,000. 
To survive, they have resorted to a variety of measures, 
including scaling down production and storing 
processed palm oil (but this is a lot more difficult for 
poorer millers for whom ability to quickly sell is key 
to their survival). Others are, however, exploring new 
businesses opportunities, such as soap production, 
or leveraging on social media and highlighting delivery 
services to market their products. 
As part of government’s COVID-19 alleviation package, 
the National Board for Small Scale Industries (NBSSI) 
has introduced a GH¢ 600 million stimulus package for 
small and medium enterprises. The leadership of the 
association for artisanal millers has approached NBSSI 
for assistance on behalf of members (executive of 
Artisanal Palm Oil, pers. comm. May 2020). However, 
stakeholders would like to see more substantial 
support from the government. For instance, an 
OPDAG executive remains unimpressed with the 
stimulus package of GH¢600 million introduced by 
government to assuage the impact on small and 
medium enterprises (SME):
“They said they have about 200,000 companies or 
SMEs that are going to benefit from that package. 
So, using our maths that means each SME is going 
to get an amount of GH¢3000. And GH¢3000 in 
an oil palm sector, I think it is nothing” (executive of 
OPDAG, pers. comm. May 2020). 
Accordingly, OPDAG has started engagements with 
officials at NBSSI for more substantial assistance. 
According to the interviewed OPDAG executive: 
“The amount the oil palm sector needs for 
reallocation, it’s in hundreds of thousands, not tens 
of thousands. If you really want to save the sector 
in this pandemic, the amount mentioned by the 
government as a stimulus package, we think it is 
not enough”. 
However, other players admit that government is 
already under severe fiscal constraints and cannot 
realistically do much more than it is currently doing" 
(GOPDC manager, pers comm. May 2020).
The pandemic also affected the timeline for the 
launch of the much-anticipated TCDA. It shifted 
the attention of policymakers to managing the 
impact of the pandemic. A committee set up to 
operationalise the implementation of the act that set 
up the authority was submitted to the sector minister 
in March, for onward transmission to cabinet for 
approval. The president was originally supposed to 
have launched the authority in June. However, at the 
beginning of June, the committee’s report had yet 
to undergo cabinet consideration, partly because 
the government was almost exclusively focused on 
fighting the pandemic and did not seem to be in a 
position to give the about GH¢ 5 million initial amount 
necessary to operationalise the TCDA. The authority 
was finally inaugurated on 29 September 2020, and 
during the ceremony the president underscored the 
need to prioritise the cash crop sector. He believed 
that by strengthening the link between agriculture 
and industry, his agricultural policies would ‘develop 
our rural economies, and assist in the structural 
transformation of the national economy. All these will 
propel growth, create employment, particularly for the 
youth, and the creation of wealth’ (GOG 2020).
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Oil palm is one of the most important crops in Ghana. 
It played a crucial role in the transition from the slave 
trade to legitimate commerce in West Africa, made 
substantial contributions to the revenue of the Gold 
Coast colonial government, and since independence, 
has featured prominently in the development agenda 
of successive Ghanaian governments. However, 
the sector has continued to underperform in spite 
of its strategic importance to the economy and the 
sustained policy attention devoted to it. To explain 
this paradoxical outcome, this paper has shown 
how attempts to develop the oil palm value chain is 
constrained by political economy factors, such as land 
tenure arrangements and the competitive clientelist 
political settlement that shapes the way policies 
are formulated in the country. In particular, insecure 
access to land continues to restrict the ability of 
estates to expand their plantations and forces them 
to rely on smallholders. Moreover, because of their 
weak position in the country’s political settlement, 
the industrial segment of the value chain continues 
to be neglected in resource allocation in spite of the 
government’s own rhetorical commitment to industry-
led economic growth.
Efforts to revive the sector have yielded little results 
because they have insufficiently dealt with the complex 
organisation of the value chain. Even though the value 
chain has two separate segments with their own 
internal organisation, actors in the separate segments 
sometimes overlap, creating problems arising from 
clashing interests and unequal access to power and 
resources. For instance, estate mills are compelled to 
source FFBs from independent smallholder farmers 
to make up for the shortfall in their plantation output. 
However, independent smallholders have very little 
incentives to comply with the rigorous quality standards 
of the estates, because the home-consumption 
market provides them with an alternative outlet for 
their produce. Moreover, independent smallholders 
are resistant to attempts to reduce prices in response 
to fluctuations on the world market. This became 
especially problematic during the COVID-19-induced 
lockdowns, which halted international trade for much 
of 2020 and led to a sharp decline in the price of CPO.
Recent policies have not effectively addressed the 
segmented nature of the value chain, even though 
the success of policies targeting the sector is 
dependent on the cooperation of both segments. 
This problem is exacerbated by two aspect of the 
multiparty system, namely:
• a rhetorical commitment to poverty reduction 
and economic transformation; and 
• the logic of electoral competition, which 
predisposes government officials to focus on 
short-term political calculations. 
The focus on poverty reduction has motivated 
the policy strategy of targeting smallholders with 
inputs like seedlings and fertilisers. However, poor 
supporting infrastructure, weak marketing systems, 
and inadequate industry-wide integration continue 
to frustrate such efforts. At the same time, political 
leaders prefer the distribution of targeted goods to 
smallholders because of its potential electoral payoffs. 
Consequently, it is extremely difficult to end such 
programmes even when they fail to yield desired 
outcomes. Within this political context, policymakers 
are reluctant to make tough but necessary decisions 
regarding the sector or to stick to such decisions 
once they are made. As a result, policies designed 
to promote growth in the oil palm industry have failed 
to resolve the longstanding structural barriers to 
productivity. The consequence is that after a century 
and a half of more or less sustained policy attention, 
the sector is as productive as it would have been had 
it been left to operate on its own. 
8 CONCLUSION
31Working Paper 054 | March 2021
Adjei-Nsiah, S.; Sakyi-Dawson, O. and Kuyper, T.W. (2012) ‘Exploring Opportunities for Enhancing Innovation in 
Agriculture: The case of oil palm production in Ghana’, Journal of Agricultural Science 4.10:  212–223
Amanor, K.; Yaro, J. and Teye, J. (2020) Long-Term Change and Agricultural Commercialisation in Ghanaian 
Cocoa, APRA Working Paper 31, Brighton: Future Agricultures Consortium
Amarteifio, W. (2020) ‘Ameen Sangari Closed Down by Management After Staff Protest’, Prime News Ghana, 2 
March 2020 (accessed 30 October 2020)
Ambassade de France au Ghana (2015) AFD and ADB signed a financial agreement for the Rubber Outgrower 
Plantation Project, Ambassade de France au Ghana website, https://gh.ambafrance.org/AFD-and-ADB-signed-
a-financial-agreement-for-the-Rubber-Outgrower-Plantation (accessed 30 May 2020)
Appiah, D. and Abdulai, A.-G. (2017) Competitive Clientelism and the Politics of Core Public Sector Reform in 
Ghana, ESID Working Paper No. 82, Manchester: Global Development Institute
Appiah-Kubi, K. (2001) ‘State-Owned Enterprises and Privatisation in Ghana’, The Journal of Modern African 
Studies 39.2: 197–229
Asante, E.A. (2012) The Case of Ghana’s President’s Special Initiative on Oil Palm (PSI-oil palm), DIIS Working 
Paper 2012: 11, Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies
Asante, K.T. (2018) ‘“Intimate Knowledge of the Country”: Factionalism in the Mid-Nineteenth-Century Gold Coast 
Administration’, African Economic History 46.2: 63–92
Asante, K.T. (2019) ‘Nested Patriotism: Revisiting Collaboration, Resistance and Agency in Colonial Ghana’, 
International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society 33.3: 347-364
Asante, K.T. and Khisa, M. (2019) ‘Political Corruption and the Limits of Anti-Corruption Activism in Ghana’, in I. 
Amundsen (ed.), Political Corruption in Africa, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing
B&FT (Business and Financial Times) (2020) ‘Local Oil Palm Producers Hail 50% Benchmark Value Exemption’, 
B&FT Online, 19 May 2020, (accessed 30 May 2020)
Banful, A.B. (2009) Operational Details of the 2008 Fertilizer Subsidy in Ghana—Preliminary Report, Ghana 
Strategy Support Programme (GSSP) Background Paper 18, Accra: International Food Policy Research Institute
Banful, A.B. (2011) ‘Old Problems in the New Solutions? Politically Motivated Allocation of Program Benefits and 
the “New” Fertilizer Subsidies’, World Development 39.7: 1166–1176
Behuria, P. (2020) ‘The Domestic Political Economy of Upgrading in Global Value Chains: How Politics Shapes 
Pathways for Upgrading in Rwanda’s Coffee Sector’, Review of International Political Economy, 27.2: 348–376
Bentil, N.L. (2019) ‘GOPDC Calls on Government to Review Benchmark Valuation’ Daily Graphic, 15 July 2019, 
(accessed 30 May 2020)
Boafo-Arthur, K. (1999) ‘Ghana: Structural Adjustment, Democratization, and the Politics of Continuity’, African 
Studies Review 42.2: 41–72
Castellanos-Navarrete, A. and Jansen, K. (2018) ‘Is Oil Palm Expansion a Challenge to Agroecology? Smallholders 
Practising Industrial Farming in Mexico’, Journal of Agrarian Change 18.1: 132–155
REFERENCES
32 Working Paper 054 | March 2021
Donovan, J. et al. (2015) ‘Guides for Value Chain Development: A Comparative Review’, Journal of Agribusiness 
in Developing and Emerging Economies 5.1: 2–23
Dummet, R.E. (1983) ‘African Merchants of the Gold Coast, 1860–1905, Dynamics of Indigenous Entrepreneurship’, 
Comparative Studies in Society and History 25.4: 661–693
Dzanku, F.M. et al. (2020) Smallholder Farmers’ Choice of Oil Palm Commercialisation Model and Household 
Welfare in South-western Ghana, Working Paper 43, Brighton: Future Agricultures Consortium
Dzanku, F.M. and Hodey, L.S. (2019) Oil Palm Commercialisation Models and Outcomes in South-Western 
Ghana, unpublished research report, Brighton: Institute of Development Studies  
FAO (2005) Fertilizer Use by Crop in Ghana, Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FAO (2020) FAO Food Price Index (accessed 4 June 2020)
Fitchratings (2020) Asian Crude Palm Oil Watch 1Q20 (accessed 4 June 2020)
Fold, N. and Whitfield, L. (2012) Developing a Palm Oil Sector: The Experiences of Malaysia and Ghana Compared, 
DIIS Working Paper 2012: 08, Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies
Fosu, A. and Aryeetey, E. (2017) ‘The Importance of Political Economy and Ghana’s Post-Independence Economic 
Growth Performance’, in F. A. Asante, R. Osei, and G. Owusu (eds), Development Policies and Practices in 
Ghana: A Reader, Accra: Institute of Statistical, Social and Economic Research
GOG (2020) ‘President Akufo-Addo Inaugurates Tree Crop Development Authority; Headquarters in Kumasi’, The 
Presidency, Republic of Ghana, 29 September 2020 (accessed 30 October 2020)
GOG (no date) Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) for 2019–2022. Ministry of Food and Agriculture: 
Programme Based Budget Estimates for 2019, Accra: Government of Ghana
GSS (2012) 2010 Population and Housing Census: Final Results, Accra: Ghana Statistical Service
GSS (2019) Ghana Living Standards Survey (GLSS) 7: Main Report, Accra: Ghana Statistical Service
Gyasi, E.A. (1992) ‘Emergence of a New Oil Palm Belt in Ghana’, Tijdschrift Voor Economische en Sociale 
Geografie 83.1: 39–49
Heerink, N.; Atsma, P. and Fosu, K.Y. (1997) ‘Farmers’ Transport Costs and Agricultural Production in Ghana’, 
in W.K. Asenso-Okyere,; G. Benneh and W. Tims (eds), Sustainable Food Security in West Africa, New York: 
Springer International Publishing
Hickey, S. (2013) Thinking About the Politics of Inclusive Development: Towards a Relational Approach’, ESID 
Working Paper No. 1, Manchester: Global Development Institute
Hickey, S. and Du Toit, A. (2013). ‘Adverse Incorporation, Social Exclusion, and Chronic Poverty’, In A. Shepherd 
and J. Brunt (eds), Chronic Poverty, London: Palgrave Macmillan
Huddleston, P. and Tonts, M. (2007) ‘Agricultural Development, Contract Farming and Ghana’s Oil Palm Industry’, 
Geography 92.3: 266–278
ISSER (2019) The State of the Ghana Economy in 2018, Accra: Institute of Statistical, Social and Economic 
Research
Johnson, T.J. (1972) ‘Protest: Tradition and Change: An Analysis of Southern Gold Coast Riots 1890–1920’, 
Economy and Society 1.2: 164–193
Khan, M.H. (2005) ‘Markets, States and Democracy: Patron–Client Networks and the Case for Democracy in 
Developing Countries’, Democratisation 12.5: 704–724
Khan, M.H. (2018) ‘Political Settlements and the Analysis of Institutions’, African Affairs, 117.469: 636–655
Khatun, K. et al. (2020) ‘From Agroforestry to Agroindustry: Smallholder Access to Benefits from Oil Palm in 
Ghana and the Implications for Sustainability Certification’, Frontiers in Sustainable Food Systems 4: 1–13
33Working Paper 054 | March 2021
Kimble, D. (1963) A Political History of Ghana: the Rise of Gold Coast Nationalism, 1850–1928, Oxford: Clarendon 
Press
Law, R. (1995) ‘Introduction’, in R. Law (ed), From Slave Trade to ‘Legitimate’ Commerce: The Commercial 
Transition in Nineteenth Century West Africa, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
Manley, R. and Van Leynseele, Y. (2019) ‘Peasant Agency in Ghana’s Oil Palm Sector: The Impact of Multiple 
Markets on Food Sovereignty’, Journal of Agrarian Change 19.4: 654–670
MASDAR (2011) Master Plan Study for the Oil Palm Industry in Ghana: Final Report, Accra: Ministry of Food and 
Agriculture
MoFA (2017a) Agriculture in Ghana: Facts and Figures (2016), Accra: Ministry of Food and Agriculture
MoFA (2017b) Planting for Food and Jobs: Strategic Plan for Implementation (2017–2020), Accra: Ministry of Food 
and Agriculture
MoFA (2019a) Ministry of Food and Agriculture Operational Performance (2017–2018), Accra: Ministry of Food 
and Agriculture
MoFA (2019b) ‘Planting for Export and Rural Development in the Ahanta West Municipality: Concept Note’, Accra: 
Ministry of Food and Agriculture
MoFA (no date), ‘Programme for the Promotion of Perennial Crops in Ghana, Accra: Ministry of Food and 
Agriculture (accessed 30 May 2020)
Ofosu-Budu, K. and Sarpong, D. (2013) ‘Oil Palm Industry Growth in Africa: A Value Chain and Smallholders’ 
Study for Ghana’, in A. Elbehri (ed), Rebuilding West Africa’s Food Potential, Rome: FAO/IFAD
OPDAG (no date) ‘History and Background’, Accra: Oil Palm Development Association of Ghana (accessed 30 
May 2020)
Opoku, J. and Asante, F.A. (2008) Palm Oil Production in Ghana, Final report on the status of the oil palm industry 
in Ghana submitted to GTZ, Accra: German Technical Co-operation 
Orjinmo, N. (2019) ‘Nigeria’s Border Crisis Fuelled by Rice’, BBC News, 31 October (accessed 30 May 2020)
Osei-Amponsah, C. (2013) Improving the Quality of Crude Palm Oil: Transdisciplinary Research on Artisanal 
Processing in Kwabibirem District, Ghana, PhD dissertation, Wageningen: Wageningen University
Osei-Amponsah, C. et al. (2012) ‘Processing Practices of Small-Scale Palm oil producers in the Kwaebibirem 
District, Ghana: A Diagnostic Study’, NJAS-Wageningen Journal of Life Sciences 60: 49–56
Osei-Amponsah, C. et al. (2014) ‘Institutional Change and the Quality of Palm Oil: An Analysis of the Artisanal 
Processing Sector in Ghana’, International Journal of Agricultural Sustainability 12.3: 233–247
Prowse, M. and Moyer-Lee, J. (2014) ‘A Comparative Value Chain Analysis of Smallholder Burley Tobacco 
Production in Malawi–2003/4 and 2009/10’, Journal of Agrarian Change 14.3: 323–346
Resnick, D. (2016) Strong Democracy, Weak State: The Political Economy of Ghana’s Stalled Structural 
Transformation, IFPRI Discussion Paper 01574, Accra: International Food Policy Research Institute
Ruml, A. and Qaim, M. (2020) ‘Smallholder Farmers’ Dissatisfaction with Contract Schemes in Spite of Economic 
Benefits: Issues of Mistrust and Lack of Transparency’, The Journal of Development Studies, (accessed 30 
October 2020)
Shepherd, A. (2016) Including Small-Scale Farmers in Profitable Value Chains: Review of Case Studies on Factors 
Influencing Successful Inclusion of Small Farmers in Modern Value Chains in ACP Countries, Wageningen: 
Technical Centre for Agricultural and Rural Co-operation (CTA)
Tangri, R. (1992) ‘The Politics of Government–Business Relations in Ghana’, The Journal of Modern African 
Studies 30.1: 97–111
34 Working Paper 054 | March 2021
Teye, K.J. and Torvikey, G.D. (2018) The Political Economy of Agricultural Commercialisation in Ghana: A Review, 
APRA Working Paper 15, Brighton: Future Agricultures Consortium
Tsikata, D. and Yaro, J.A. (2013) ‘When a Good Business Model is Not Enough: Land Transactions and Gendered 
Livelihood Prospects in Rural Ghana’. Feminist Economics 20.1: 202–226
UN (2020) World food Prices Drop in March due to COVID-19 and Oil – Africa Renewal, New York: United Nations 
(accessed 4 June 2020)
Whitfield, L. (2011a) Competitive Clientelism, Easy Financing and Weak Capitalists: The Contemporary Political 
Settlement in Ghana, DIIS Working paper 2011: 27, Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies
Whitfield, L. (2011b) Growth Without Economic Transformation: Economic Impacts of Ghana’s Political Settlement, 
DIIS Working Paper 2011: 28, Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies
Wilson, L.E. (1990) ‘The "Bloodless Conquest" in Southeastern Ghana: The Huza and Territorial Expansion of the 
Krobo in the 19th Century’, The International Journal of African Historical Studies 23.2: 269–297
Yaro, J.A.; Teye, J.K. and Torvikey, G.D. (2018) ‘Historical Context of Agricultural Commercialisation in Ghana: 
Changes in Land and Labour Relations’, Journal of Asian and African Studies 53.1: 49–63
35Working Paper 054 | March 2021
Appendix 1: Hypothesis one
Even though Ghana is a coastal country, urbanisation did not have a direct impact on oil palm production and 
commercialisation. Before the early nineteenth century, oil palm was cultivated on a small-scale or harvested 
in the wild for domestic consumption, and matured trees were felled to brew palm wine. Commercialisation of 
oil palm and other agricultural commodities commenced in the wake of the abolition of the slave trade and the 
emergence of the so-called legitimate commerce (see above). Throughout the nineteenth century, production of 
palm remained in the hands of farmers in the immediate hinterlands of the coastal cities, but the coastal African 
elite acted as intermediaries between the producers and the international market. Throughout this period, the 
oil palm industry thrived without the active intervention of the colonial government. The decline of palm oil 
production and export begun after the world market price sharply declined at the end of the nineteenth century, 
prompting farmers to reallocate their lands for cocoa cultivation. Cocoa had grown to become the colony’s 
leading export commodity by the beginning to the twentieth century. When Ghana attained independence in 
1957, the country had become a net palm oil importer and attempts by successive governments to promote 
the industry yielded weak results. Currently, competition from imports make local production uncompetitive. 
Local producers have continuously petitioned government to exempt imported edible oils from reduction in 
benchmark prices. However, they have so far been unsuccessful because of countermeasures taken by the 
traders’ association who have an interest in keeping imported edible oil prices low.
Appendix 2 Hypothesis two
Not applicable
Appendix 3: Hypothesis three
Palm oil export was the leading source of foreign exchange for the colonial regime in the nineteenth century. 
However, since the beginning of the twentieth century, its contribution to foreign exchange for the country has 
been negligible. On the contrary, as a net importer, the country spends foreign exchange to make up for the 
domestic deficit in production. As a result, policies designed for the industry have been motivated by the need 
to reduce the country’s palm oil import bill. In spite of the importance of this objective, the clientelist logic of 
electoral competition have presented obstacles in the way of successful implementation of policies designed to 
promote the industry. Moreover, ruling elites attempt to use elements of these policies, such as input subsidies, 
to secure the loyalty of rural populations.
Appendix 4: Hypothesis four
Smallholder farmers dominate the cultivation of oil palm in Ghana even though production occurs in sub-national 
regions with low population density. Data from the 2010 Population and Housing Census shows generally 
low population densities in producing regions in 2010, and much lower in the preceding decades (see Table 
5). Indeed, the Eastern Region, with the largest land area under cultivation has a population density of 136 
persons/sq km, and the region with the second largest area under cultivation has a population density of only 
99 persons/sq km. Out of the six producing regions, only Central Region, has a high population density (>200 
persons/sq km). Medium- and large-scale farms have been active for decades in the value chain but have been 
unable to significantly expand their production – irrespective of the population density in their region of operation 
– owing to the complicated nature of land acquisition and the relative absence of litigation-free land.
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Appendix 5: Hypothesis five
Development partners have been engaged to attempts to promote the value chain for decades. In the 1980s, 
when the country begun implementing the structural adjustment programme, policies were developed to 
promote the direct participation of the private sector in the value chain. As a result, government offloaded 
most of its interests in the state-ran plantations and mills. Since the 2000s, policy interventions in the value 
chain explicitly incorporate poverty reduction and livelihood empowerment goals through interventions like input 
subsidies, market linkages, and rural infrastructural development. The policy shifts have largely coincided with 
the dominant views in the international donor community. 
Table A1 Population densities in oil palm growing areas
Region Area under cultivation (in 
per cent)
Population Density (no. of persons/sq km)
1984 2000 2010
Ashanti 10 86 148 196
Brong Ahafo 10 31 46 58
Central 16 116 162 224
Eastern 32 87 109 136
Volta 4 59 80 103
Western 28 48 80 99
Source: Author’s construct using data from the 2010 Population and Housing Census (GSS 2012)
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